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CASE COMMENTS
Attorney and Client-Contract of Employment-
Damages for Intermeddling
P, an attorney, was retained on a contingent fee basis by a
union member who was injured during the course of his employ-
ment. D, a union employee, coerced the client into discharging
P and allowing the union to settle the claim. P brought an action
to recover damages and the jury awarded P both compensatory
and punitive damages. The trial court entered an order adverse
to the verdict. Held, reversed, reinstating the jury verdict awarding
damages, but reducing the award of punitive damages. Coercion
or misrepresentation that induces a client to discharge his attorney
leaves the intervenor answerable for the breach of contract. The use
of threats in wanton disregard of an attorney's rights calls for
punitive damages. In view of the serious nature of the client's
injury, an award of compensatory damages was not excessive even
though it exceeded the amount the client received in settlement.
Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1963).
In recent years an attorney's cause of action for induced breach
of contract resulting from undue interference by a third party, has
become judicially recognized. State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory,
184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950); Klauder v. Cregan, 327 Pa. 1, 192
AUt. 667 (1937); 1961 Dr=E L.J. 582. Many jurisdictions allow the
recovery of damages for breach of the contingent fee agreement or
recovery in quantum meruit. Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779,
70 S.W.2d 671 (1934); Clayton v. Martin, 108 W. Va. 571, 151
S.E. 855 (1930). The West Virginia court has also specifically af-
firmed the legality of a contingent fee contract if no unfair ad-
vantage be taken of the client. Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226, 46
S.E. 1014 (1904).
One problem in this area is distinguishing between undue in-
terference and merely inducing the settlement of a claim. The
criterion for such a distinction lies in the wilful conduct of the
inducing party. The Pennsylvania court held that a client is priv-
ileged to make a settlement and, in order for an attorney to recover,
he must prove that the third party intentionally induced the client
to violate the contingent fee agreement. Klauder v. Cregan, 327
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Pa. 1, 192 Aft. 667 (1937). In a similar case, the California court
held that an action would lie for the intentional interference by a
third party with a contractual relationship either by unlawful
means or by means otherwise lawful when there is a lack of suffi-
cient justification. Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Cal.
App. 2d 202, 363 P.2d 310 (1961).
Generally, it is recognized that undue interference with an
attorney-client relationship will give rise to a cause of action, but the
amount of damages recoverable presents another problem. One
line of cases follows the view of the instant case and allows dam-
ages in excess of the value of the attorney's services and in some
cases in excess of the client's actual settlement. On the other hand,
some jurisdictions restrict the amount of damages to the reasonable
value of the attorney's services. State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory,
184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950); Greenburg v. Panama Transport Co.,
185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960); Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 202, 363 P.2d 310 (1961); See generally,
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 231 (1942).
The West Virginia court has apparently not been confronted
with the problem of a third party's interference with an attorney-
client relationship, but it has assessed damages where a client has
wrongfully dismissed his attorney. In Polsley v. Anderson, 7 W. Va.
202, 23 Am.Rep. 613 (1874), the court limited the attorney's re-
covery to damages by way of compensation for his time, labor, and
attention and as to the reasonable value thereof. The court also
took the position that the entire recovery should not exceed the
sum stipulated in the contract. Similarly, in Clayton v. Martin,
108 W. Va. 571, 151 S.E. 855 (1930), the court allowed damages
only for the value of services rendered and also stated that in the
absence of proof of the value of the services no recovery could be
had.
The West Virginia cases have used the rule established in the
Polsley v. Anderson, supra, and thus have restricted the amount of
damages recoverable. This same rule may plausibly be applied to
induced breach by a third party if a case thereon arises, but it
would seem that a more liberal rule should be adopted to discourage
an intermeddling with attorney-client contracts. The instant case
presents a reasonable solution to the problem and may well be fol-
lowed by the West Virginia court.
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
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